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Introduction 
 
 The Yakuza are one of the most rooted form of organized crime, originated in Japan. 
Yakuza represent a peculiar kind of organized crime, inasmuch they have often lived on the 
edge of legality. They had their offices showing their crests and their names, everyone knew 
who they were and part of what their activities involved. Their organizations traditionally 
used to not encroach in ordinary citizens’ lives with their illicit business (such as gambling, 
labor-broking, prostitution, protection moneys), as well as in their turf wars, even though the 
actual involvement of some society members, such as laborers, prostitutes and bar-keepers. 
Therefore, since no harm was done to people, yakuza coexisted within the society almost 
peacefully. Although it was different depending on the government and the changing 
circumstances of the periods, yakuza organizations generally enjoyed a certain degree of 
tolerance even from authorities: including police force, with which they often cooperate; and 
government parties, which often found themselves involved with organized crime.  
 In the postwar period, developments and changes, among the others, occurred also 
within yakuza organizations. On both levels, local and international, different reasons lead to 
the decision of taking action against the organized crime. Due to local factors, mostly a 
deeper involvement of the citizens in gang related activities, implying more danger in the 
daily life; and due to international factors, mainly the union of the ‘democratized countries’ 
against the fight of organized crime, with particular reference to drug related offences, Japan 
moved for the first time in a serious way against yakuza. 
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 In 1992 The Bōtaihō暴対法, or ‘Anti-bōryokudan law’, law No. 77 was implemented. 
As stated in its Article 1 the law aims to the control of the intimidation and violence acts 
carried out by the bōryokudan. Bōryokudan暴力団, literally ‘violent group’, according to this 
law, refers to the “any organized gang”, defined as “any organized crime group likely to help 
its members […] to collectively and habitually commit illegal acts of violence.” (Bōtaihō, Art. 
2.2)  During the years the bōtaihō went through several revisions, according to the realization 
of lacks within the provisions, or following the progress of the country. Together with the 
anti- bōryokudan law, through the years, other laws have been improved, or enacted, with the 
purpose of controlling, or confining yakuza activities out of the Japanese society. The most 
recent is the introduction of prefectural ordinances: these, carrying the same purpose of 
isolating暴力団員 bōryokudan-in “bōryokudan members” through the ban of their 
commercial relations with the societies’ members, slightly differentiate in their content 
depending on the local situation. Prefectural ordinances are directed to the people, who are the 
one that suffer the consequences in case of doing business with yakuza. The last prefecture to 
enact the ordinance has been Tokyo at the end of 2011. 
 In my thesis’ work I want to gather information, and see what laws, and measures, 
have been implemented  after the bōtaihō to fight the yakuza, trying to understand what is 
their final goal. At the same time, I want to find out what happened within the yakuza 
organizations while the authorities where planning against them. I will try to follow the 
development, and changes, of their activities. And in the end, after obtaining data from both 
sides, I want to compare them, and observe if the laws show themselves adequate to their 
scope, simply looking at the resulting yakuza activities. I chose the period which goes from 
the 1992, date of the bōtaihō implementation, to the 2012: a gap of twenty years which may 
be sufficient to observe some results of the anti-bōryokudan law. It will be possible to observe 
the changes within yakuza activities, using primary data as crime statistics from the ‘White 
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Papers on Crime’, and other accounts edited by the National Police Academy of Japan (NPA), 
Police Policy Research Center and Ministry Of Justice (MOJ). These years are not going to be 
enough for an adequate evaluation of the ordinances’ effect due to their recent 
implementation; nevertheless, setting the 2012 as limit works to the purpose of my research 
because it is recent, and close to nowadays, and at the same time, it is ‘old’ enough for the 
research of valuable sources. 
My research question is: looking at yakuza activities and developments during the 
twenty years between the first anti-bōryokudan law enforcement (1992) and the recent 
enactment of the prefectural ordinances (2012), did the laws do what they were supposed to?  
Have the goals that the laws were aimed at been realized?  
 In my study I am going to use mainly primary sources which can give me a real 
understanding of what happened. First of all I am going to look at the Bōtaihō itself, 
following with the provisions that came after it. Articles from different database and  
newspapers as the Asahi Shimbun (in English), together with the New York Times, and the 
Washington Post will work as complementary material to the information given by the above 
mentioned ‘White Papers on Crime’, produced by the Ministry of Justice and the other papers 
edited by the National Police Academy of Japan and Police Policy Research Center. Using 
these sources I will be able to collect data which will allow me to see what kind of criminal 
activities carried out by the yakuza have been changing during the years: which one 
increased; which one decreased; whether or not, some new activity has emerged. At the same 
time, the newspapers, even though they cannot be considered totally ‘impartial’, will help to 
give an understanding of the impact of these changes on the public. Moreover, I am going to 
use also second sources, especially the works of those considered experts in the field, such as 
Peter Hill 2003, Kaplan and Dubro 2003, and different works of Jake Adelstein produced 
between 2009 and 2011.  
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 This research contributes to previous researches, and to actual debates, because it 
doesn’t focus only on the study of the Bōtaihō itself, as it has been done in the past, but it uses 
the law as a starting point, looking at most of the other provisions against the yakuza that 
followed the anti-bōryokudan law. My thesis will be structured in three chapters, followed by 
a conclusion. The first chapter will give an introduction on the yakuza world: who they are 
and a bit of history, which will allow a better understanding of the following chapters. The 
second chapter will focus mainly on the Bōtaihō, including the reasons that led to its 
enactment, an explanation of why it has been done in this way, an analysis of the main points 
and the implementations carried out during the revisions. In the same chapter will be also 
included an overview of the recent prefectural ordinances, aiming at the reduction of the 
yakuza illegitimate business, and then at their isolation from the community; moreover a list 
of the other main measures enacted during those years is provided in appendix. Those 
provisions, even if not strictly directed to the yakuza in their statements, they aim to weaken 
gangs’ other activities, sources of income, and more in general the organizations themselves. 
The third chapter will look at yakuza activities: through data usage, it will be possible to see 
which activity has increased, or decreased; what kind of new activities have emerged; 
attention will also focus on the number of the members who belong to the different 
organizations, whether or not it has increased, or decreased; what happened to the several 
gangs themselves; and whether or not, these changes are the direct outcomes of the measures 
enacted, or if they also result from other factors, such as economic changes. The third chapter 
will include a discussion as well, based on the comparison of the data resulting from chapter 
two (laws’ implementation) and the first part of chapter three (changing on yakuza activities), 
giving therefore an answer to the research question. Finally, the conclusion will focus on the 
sum up of my findings.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 This first chapter will focus on an introduction of the yakuza: an explanation on who 
they are; what are the biggest organizations; how many members they count. Thereafter, 
yakuza history will be briefly presented, followed by the main developments and changes 
regarding their activities, and behaviors towards the citizens, that led to the yakuza 
organizations as known today. These information will serve for a better understanding  of the 
subsequent chapters, making it easier to follow the developments on the law side, and the 
changes within the yakuza organizations.  
 The term yakuza indicate the members of the gangs of one of the most rooted form of 
organized crime. It originated and developed in Japan, and together with the globalization 
gradually evolved in the so called transnational criminal organization. As pointed out in 
Siegel and Nelen 2008, transnational crimes differ from international crimes because the 
transnational ones includes acts which violate the laws of more than one country.  
The term yakuza ヤクザ originated with the bakuto (traditional gamblers), who used the word 
to indicate the worst possible score in the hanafuda (flower card) card game, 8ヤ(ya)-9ク
(ku)-3ザ(za). At first used within the gambling society to indicate something useless, 
eventually it turned up to indicate the gamblers themselves, meaning that they were useless to 
society, hence born to lose. In the twentieth century its usage was extended to denote also 
tekiya (street peddlers) and the rest of the members of the gangs (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
Another term commonly used today to indicate organized crime in Japan is暴力団
bōryokudan: literally ‘violent group’, according to the anti-bōryokudan law of the 1991, it 
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refers to the “any organized gang”, defined as “any organized crime group likely to help its 
members […] to collectively and habitually commit illegal acts of violence.” (Bōtaihō, Art. 
2.2)  
 According to the White Paper on Crime 2013, which reports information until 2012, 
the most recent data indicate the presence of 63.200 gangs’ members in total. As of June 2012, 
NPA reports as the biggest three designated gangs the Yamaguchi-gumi with 15.200 members, 
the Sumiyoshi-kai with 5.600 members, and the Inagawa-kai with 4.000. Actually, these three 
groups started to consolidate their power in the postwar period, after the end of the US 
Occupation, and have been at the top since then. 
How Yakuza come to being 
Regarding the yakuza origin, there are different stories that link their “ancestors” very 
back in time, some of them are probably just tales, some depict yakuza as heroes, some give 
less bright images of them. Nevertheless, according to Kaplan and Dubro 2003, it seems that 
those who are today considered the true ancestors of yakuza were enterprising members of a 
medieval underworld known as bakuto, or traditional gamblers, and tekiya, street peddlers.  
The actual early yakuza groups started to appear around the mid- 1700s as bakuto and  
tekiya. The ranks of both groups were composed by the same kind of people: the poor, the 
landless, the delinquents, and the misfits. Each group had different territories to carry out their 
business, so that they would not get into each other’s way: the bakuto worked mainly on 
highways and towns of old Japan, while the tekiya were settled around the nation’s markets 
and fairs.( Kaplan and Dubro 2003,) 
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Modern yakuza 
During the Meiji Restoration, Japan perform its first economic miracle turning into an 
industrial power: it witnessed the birth and development of the first parliament and parties, as 
well as of the growth of a powerful military. Following Kaplan and Dubro 2003, it seems that 
together with the country, the yakuza extended their activities within the growing economy: 
even though their previous involvement in the fields, they started to gather casual laborers for 
construction jobs, moving deeper in the construction industry, as well as making their 
connections to the docks stronger through the recruitment of stevedores. Gambling remained 
the core of their business, although they had been forced further underground by police 
control. In this period boss’ started legitimate business as fronts for money laundering, linked 
to gangs’ activities as rackets; and they also started to make pay off to local police. The 
groups kept good relations with politics, developing close ties with important officials, seeing 
in cooperation the best way to gain what they wanted; on the other hand the government used 
the gangs every time it needed them.  
 After the war, yakuza flourished, and their power increased like never before. It all 
started when Americans decided there was no need to give to Japanese under Occupation 
more than the necessary to survive, while food shortages spread all over the country. Within 
this context emerged the best conditions to give rise to the diffusion of black markets, where 
there was a lot of money to be made. At the same time, as consequences of the Japanese 
actions during the war, a new class arose in the country: the so called sangokujin (Kaplan and 
Dubro 2003:35), made up of Asian minorities (mainly Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans) 
living in Japan, who were brought there as workers in factories and several unskilled jobs 
during the war. The rancorous, exploited, and continuously judged sangokujin, after the 
surrender, blew up into several attacks against Japanese citizens; took control of many of the 
nation’s major black markets; and became spies, and informers, for the US officials. The 
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Japanese Police weakened by the Occupation, and lacking an effective leadership, did not 
have the means to intervene. At this point, yakuza stepped in, against the sangokujin. They 
were driven by two main reasons: they were outraged by the attacks to the citizens; and by the 
sangokujin, who were foreigners taking possession of the most of the black markets. Yakuza 
enjoyed in this period general consent, to the point to be considered heroes saving Japan from 
“evil foreigners” (Kaplan and Dubro 2003:36). 
    The San Francisco Peace Treaty on April 1952 officially marked the end of the 
Occupation. During the 1950s Japan started to rise again: the economy started to pick up; the 
industrial sector was regaining fast, thanks to the high demand of construction projects (roads, 
apartment blocks, different types of infrastructure), and thanks to the demand of military 
equipment generated by the Korean War (Hill 2003). 
 Yakuza organizations began to consolidate their forces, and some of the thousands’ 
gangs to dominate. The basis of their power were mainly in Osaka/Kobe in the west, from 
where names like Yamaguchi-gumi  and Honda-kai started to emerge; and Tokyo/Yokohama 
in the east, where the most known gangs were Kinsei-kai, Tosei-kai, and Sumiyoshi-kai. 
Modern yakuza activities started to shape: first of all, as the economy recovered yakuza 
presence in the black market was no longer needed, indeed they switched from controlling 
necessities to the control of luxuries, and soon understood that big money was to be made 
after non-essentials. (Kaplan and Dubro 2003) 
 Yakuza ended up monopolizing amphetamines’ market: this drug, used during the war 
by the soldiers to keep on going, had been produced in large quantity and even after the war, 
the demand was still high.  
 Prostitution became one of the pillar of yakuza’s activities, especially after the 1956. 
Before that date, prostitution was legal, and it was not directly controlled by yakuza, even 
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though their indirect involvement through protection money. Gangs came to be involved in 
two other sectors of the sex industry: ‘date clubs’ and management of street and foreign 
prostitutes. Both these kind of business do not require a large capital investment, indeed for 
‘date clubs’ the only things needed are a telephone line, a driver, a receptionist and ‘sex-
workers’. Clients call the number, often advertised on fliers, and are directed to love hotels 
where they are going to meet a girl. Regarding the foreign prostitutes, they are usually women 
who enter the country illegally or whose visa is expired. Mostly they come from Asian 
countries such as Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and they are promised with 
jobs like waitress, factory workers, hostesses or nannies, but once they get into the country 
they are sold from the first broker (usually a native of the country where the girl comes from) 
to a second broker (usually a yakuza) to clubs. All this selling makes the women in the 
position of being in debt with the last ‘buyer’, so they have to work to repay those debts 
before they can earn for themselves. Eventually some of these women manage to pay their 
debt, and to be ‘set free’, anyway, this is just a small percentage of what happens within this 
sex industry area (Hill 2003). 
 The business which made yakuza what they are, gambling, was in part legalized. 
Another big source of revenue was supplied by the Korean War, requiring large construction 
projects and heavy demand for shipping, in impacted areas under the control of the yakuza. 
Some of the organizations started their own contracting firms; others resumed their function 
of labor brokers and hiring muscles.  
 Together with the rise of life’s standards, entertainment was again part of the activities 
enjoyed by Japanese people, who now had money and leisure time. The entertainment field 
slowly would become almost yakuza’s  monopoly: they were involved in professional sports, 
from ancient sumo to baseball; movies industry, theater and cabarets were under their direct 
control (Kaplan and Dubro 2003).  
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 As from the authorities’ side, the reaction was contrasting: on one hand, police forces 
were fighting against the gang power with crackdowns and arrests (a more developed section 
about the relationship between yakuza and police can be found in the appendix); on the other 
hand, high political officials, especially in the LDP right wing, were more interested in 
keeping close ties with them (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
 During the war’s aftermath yakuza structure and methods changed. They became more 
violent; swords were leaving place to guns; and ordinary citizens turned to be targets of 
robberies and street shakedowns. Some of the organizations kept on expanding and dominate 
bigger regions through turf wars, or alliances. The period of tolerance for the yakuza officially 
ended with the systematic crackdown carried out by the police when the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympics rolled around. From 1979 to 1998, Japan’s top three crime groups- the Yamaguchi-
gumi, Sumiyoshi-kai, and Inagawa-kai- grew from 40 to 82 percent of all official yakuza 
members. (Kaplan and Dubro 2003) 
 In the following years yakuza’s business moved deeper into corruption, resulting at the 
end of the 1980s in an very diversified set of activities. Known as sarakin, they were 
companies originated to provide services where the banking system failed. They offered loans 
to everyone with very high rates of interests. Sarakin companies were a legal business, and 
most of them were not run by yakuza. Even though they maintained close ties with yakuza, 
who worked as an insurance policy. Their connection didn’t stop here, indeed for those who 
were denied access to sarakin finance, yakuza represented the last chance. Defined as Yakuza 
loan-sharking, they worked on system called to-ichi (ten-one), meaning that every ten days a 
charge of one-tenth of the loan has to be paid to the lender until it is extinguished. Sometimes 
loan-sharking business were carried among yakuza. (Hill 2003) 
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 Probably the most significant change within the deep turn into violence, and almost 
certainly, one of the causes of yakuza’s loss of tolerance among the people, are the Minji 
Kainyū Bōryoku (violent intervention in civil affairs) , also known as minbō, which include 
different kind of activities aiming to earn money. Minbō came into existence in response to 
the decrease in the traditional sources of revenue provided by gambling, and led to an increase 
of yakuza penetration in legitimate society and business (Hill 2003:119). Literally the 
expression means ‘violent intervention in civil affairs’. At the lowest level of minbō’s 
operations is the yakuza’s exploitation of injuries or damages, real or invented, to the 
expenses of citizens. One of the most known is their intervention in traffic disputes. Even 
when gangs are not directly involved in the different kind of accidents, they can be hired to 
solve these kind of disputes. The recourse to yakuza intervention (at least for certain activities 
within the minbō business) is considered convenient due to the inadequacies of the legal 
system. The Japanese legal system results slow and complex, implying high costs in money 
and time for citizens who go through civil cases, before a conclusion is reached (Hill 
2003:119). 
 Jiage, or land-sharking, is another activity which suits yakuza’s way of doing business. 
Their role in the land-sharking, is that to free lands, or buildings, from the previous owners: to 
this purpose they are willing to use any tactics, from loud music, threats, car crashing within 
the property. One reason that brought to the establishment of jiage is that Japanese law makes 
it very hard to evict tenants from property, even in the cases when contract terms are violated; 
nevertheless, real-estate agents didn’t hesitate to employ yakuza to clear a given site which 
would have been a big source of income (Hill 2003).  
 It was around the 1960s that yakuza got seriously involved in sokaiya. Sokaiya are 
basically corporate blackmailers, who having bought one share of a company, are allowed to 
attend the company’s annual general shareholders’ meeting, and there threaten managers to 
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disclose sensitive information about either their business or private life scandals, usually in 
exchange of money; or they may have been hired from other competitive companies (Hill 
2003). 
Keizai yakuza 
From the middle 1980s to the 1990 the Japanese economy reached the highest levels, 
in particular regarding real estate and stock market values. No one was better suited than the 
bakuto to take advantage of this economic growth. They started to invest in real estate and 
stock markets making huge deals. At the same time, banks were handing out as much loans as 
possible, making the big mistake to not check out their clients. The Keizai yakuza, or 
economic gangsters, were enjoying this mistake more than anyone else. During the Bubble 
Economy yakuza got deeper involved in the construction industry, and began to get their 
hands on the booming pirate video industry. One of the main investment at this time were the 
golf courses, yakuza began to build an empire around them(Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
 Eventually the Bubble collapsed, dragging down with it stock markets values, land 
prices, golf courses, and the like. The deflation of the economy showed how far yakuza 
penetrated the Japanese society, and a decade of scandals followed (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
 As a consequence of the above mentioned changes within yakuza activities, and 
attitudes towards the citizens at local level and due to international factors (seen in the next 
chapter), Japan for the first time is driven to take serious measures against the yakuza.  
 Now that a clear overview of yakuza has been given, the attention can be turned to the 
stronger measures taken by the authorities among the 1992 and 2012, and see what happened 
during those same years within yakuza gangs.  
L’Aurora 14 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In this chapter, attention will be paid to the reasons that drove to the enactment of the 
law, and why the “anti-yakuza law” has been drafted in the way it is. Then, focus will be 
directed on the main innovations, measures, and goals of this law. Since the period taken in 
consideration in this work goes from the 1992 to the 2012, we will also look at the 
implementation of some existing rules, and new ones, always in regard to the fight against 
organized crime, aiming at the reduction, and elimination, of the illegitimate yakuza business, 
and to the gangs’ members’ isolation from society. 
Towards the anti- bōryokudan law 
 To give an understanding of the crime situation involving organized crime, during the 
years before the implementation of the “anti-yakuza law”, statistically it seems that  
Between 1960 and 1992, yakuza members were responsible for 15 to 20 percent of all 
homicide cases, 10 to 20 percent of the burglaries, 15 to 25 percent of assaults, 30 to 
40 percent of blackmail, and 40 to 50 percent of intimidation. They also fill Japan’s 
penal institutions, comprising some 40 percent of the prison population. (Kaplan and 
Dubro 2003:129) 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, at the beginning of the 1990s, after the recent 
changes in yakuza attitudes towards common people, their deeper involvement, and 
consequently growing power and influence, on both levels of economy and politics 
(government-authorities), the need for more serious measures against the yakuza was clear.  
 In addition to the above mentioned, two more factors, at political and international 
level, gave the go-ahead to the draw up of new yakuza-control measures. On one end, 
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scandals kept on surfacing at the expenses of the LDP party, and when in August 1989 Kaifu 
Toshiki became Prime Minister, he tried to repair the party’s image: among the other reforms 
under his leadership there was the stimulus for the proposal of what would became the 
Bōtaihō. On the other end, the international factor was driven mostly by the USA: first of all, 
American law-enforcement officers were well aware of Japanese yakuza operating on US soil 
since the early 1980s; second, after the end of the Cold War, industrialized countries, having 
defeated communism, turned to the fight against organized crime and drug offences; third, in 
regard of its political interests, in America eyes the two things, fight against organized crime 
and drugs offences, were the same. Japan situation was different: the yakuza involvement in 
drugs’ offences was not really significant, indeed the revenue from drug dealing was at most 
one-third of the yakuza business (Hill 2003); and furthermore, unlike their American 
counterparts, Japanese organized crime dealt mainly with amphetamines, instead of cocaine 
and heroin.  
In the 1986 at G7 Tokyo Economic Summit, the nations which participated, released a joint 
declaration in support of an improved international cooperation in anti-drugs measures; in the 
1988 at the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, the countries who agreed, were required an international 
cooperation to punish money-laundering, and to identify and seize the drug dealing’s illegal 
profits. At the time of the convention Japan didn’t sign, and it was criticized for that. So in 
this context, and to maintain good relations with the US which was increasing threats of 
economic retaliation, Japan Prime Minister Kaifu decided to join a ‘global partnership in the 
war against drugs’ with Bush in 1989. (Hill 2003)  
 After the first crackdown on yakuza in the 1960s, it resulted evident that the existing 
laws were not helping police, instead they kind of made the situation even worst, leading the 
small syndicates towards alliances with the bigger and more powerful ones. One of the main 
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problem was that the Japanese law-enforcement force was dealing with organized crime 
through the enforcement of laws intended for individual criminal activities. Moreover, 
yakuza’s activities often involved the threat, but not the use of violence itself: it is hard to 
prove use of threats in court, although it may be possible with the aid of witnesses, who at the 
time were not willing to cooperate, due to fear of retaliation and absence of witnesses’ 
protection system.  
Building the Bill: NPA at work 
 In November 1990 the NPA put together a group of fifteen man, made up of external 
academics and legal experts, who were commissioned to draft an anti-bōryokudan law. The 
members of the group were kept secret, except for the chairman Professor Narita from 
Yokohama University, and two representatives from the Nichibenren (JFB – Japan Federation 
of Bar Association). After only four meetings, the last of which on February 6
th
 1991, the 
group published their initial proposal, although they have been given two or three years to 
prepare it. Among the critics to this speed drafting work, Miyagi suggested that the NPA had 
already some work done on this project; while according to Shimamura, due to the fact that 
the law was prepared under the NPA’s conditions of secrecy, it went through a different 
procedure avoiding legislative deliberative committee and legislative office under Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ)’s supervision. (Hill 2000) 
Twenty days later, on February 27
th, the NPA published its ‘Basic Considerations on 
the Bill Concerning Bōryokudan Countermeasures’ (bōryokudan taisaku ni kan-suru hoan no 
kihonteki na kangaekata). The content of this document is what would later become the bill 
itself, a part from two provisions included here, but dropped in the final draft: illegally gained 
profits’ seizure, and bōryokudan exclusion from certain industries.  
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There are two existing approaches aiming to the fight of the organized crime which could 
have worked as datum point for those drafting the Japanese new anti-yakuza law: the 
European model, and the American RICO statute. These two systems have been briefly 
introduced in the appendix. Under RICO influence, the seizure of illegally gained profits was 
suggested, but dropped mainly for three reasons: the difficulties to distinguish what was 
illegally gained from what was legitimate; because seizure would come under criminal law, 
while as we will see the bill relies on administrative law, consequently there would have been 
the risk of a double punishment; finally, at the same time the anti- bōryokudan’s bill was 
being drafted by the NPA, the MOJ was working on another law which would allow Japan to 
conform to the requirements of the UN Convention Against Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. Since MOJ included among the law’s provisions the seizure of drug trafficking’s 
revenues under criminal law, it seemed wiser to wait to see its results before extending the 
seizure further in the NPA’s bill.  
The other dumped measure was bōryokudan exclusion from certain industries, focusing on 
particular on their involvement in debt-collection, real-estate racketeering and bankruptcy 
management. It was excluded from the final bill because it could have been in conflict with 
the article 22 of the 1947 Constitution, which guarantees individuals’ freedom to choose their 
own occupation. Nevertheless, this was not the only reason, which eventually a good legal 
case could have overcome: the other cause was due to the fact that bōryokudan exclusion 
would have given rise to long discussion with the different ministries in charge of the 
measure’s targeted industries; therefore, NPA gave up on this provision to quickly get to the 
enactment and implementation of the law. (Hill 2000) 
 After one month from the approval of the cabinet for the legislation’s submission, 
finally in May 1991, the暴力団員による不当な行為の防止等に関する法律 Bōryokudan-
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in ni yoru futōna kōi no bōshinado ni kansuru hōritsu (Law Regarding the Prevention of 
Unjust Acts by Bōryokudan Members) was passed into law by the Diet. Law’s name is 
usually abbreviated in bōryokudan taisaku ho (bōryokudan countermeasures law), eventually 
cut in 暴対法 Bōtaihō.  
暴対法 The Bōtaihō 
The暴対法 Bōtaihō (Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991) was implemented on March 1992. 
Article 1 of the law states its purpose: it aim to the control of the intimidation and violence 
acts carried out by the bōryokudan. At the same time it undertakes the responsibilities to 
provide for the promotion of activity of civic public service organizations to prevent dangers 
to citizens’ life raising from gangs’ turf wars; to secure the safe and peaceful people’s daily 
life and to protect their freedom and rights.  
 The Bōtaihō relies completely on行政法 gyōsei-hō “administrative law”, unlike the 
other two models (described above) which are parts of the criminal legal code. Where a 
violation of the刑法 keihō “criminal law” can be subjected to prosecution and punishment, 
acts that break administrative law are subjected to an injunction, and only after the injunction 
violation a punishment can be inflicted. Due to the nature of yakuza’s activities often 
involved in grey-zone, hence on the verge of legitimacy, involved more often in threats than 
in real violent acts (like in minbō cases), given the demand to a certain extent of their services 
and since the lack of witnesses willing to cooperate, being the gangs tied to legitimate 
business, the adoption of an administrative law model seemed the best choice. This is because 
it provides the option of a “warning” (the injunction), and at a later stage, if the injunction is 
violate, with the possible obtainment of more evidences, a punishment, or further measures, 
can be carried on.  
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 An analysis of the law has been here carried on, based on its English translation, 
which can be found on the English version of the NPA website. The anti-bōryokudan law’s 
biggest innovation is the fact that it empowers authorities to ‘criminalize’ under certain 
circumstances, yakuza organizations that had been able to work on a legitimate way until its 
enactment. According to Article 3, the Prefectural Public Safety Commission is enabled to 
designate a gang as ‘very likely […] to commit collectively and habitually illegal acts of 
violence’ (Art.3, Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991) if the said gang entails all the items contained 
in the article: like take advantage of the gang’s influence as means of threat to obtain 
something in return; according to the percentage of members within the said gang holding 
criminal records; whether or not, the gang has organized on a hierarchical structure, under the 
control of a person who either represent the gang itself, or its management. The following 
Article 4, applies quite the same items to the designation of union of gangs.  
 Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, provide the guideline to follow by The Public Safety Commission in 
the designation procedure. In order to respect the formal requirement related to the thesis 
length, I am going to focus mainly on the Art. 9 that regards the activities forbidden to the 
designated gangs, and these articles that are more directly connected to the purpose of this 
chapter; while an overview of the remaining articles will be still provided in the appendix .  
 A 指定暴力団 shitei bōryokudan “designated gang” is forbidden to engage in all those 
kind of activities which require violent demands. Violent demands are defined by the law as 
‘acts provided for in Article 9’: implying acts committed displaying the influence of the 
designated gang to which he belongs, or another hierarchically superior designated gang. The 
main act forbidden by Art. 9 is “extortion”: it occupies good half of the article, focusing on 
the different activities in which yakuza are involved. It forbids designated gangs’ members to 
demand any person “[…]to offer money, valuables or other material advantages […]” in 
compensation for the several “services”, or threats, provided by yakuza: such as  
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 […]revealing publicly unknown facts related to the person[…],“[…]for 
contracting, commissioning or entrusting to accept taking orders for the whole or part 
of the said business, the delivery of materials or any other goods or the offer of 
services related to the said business in spite of their refusal. […]”, “[…]for tacitly 
approving him to conduct the business irrespective of whatever pretext they may do it 
for […]”,“[…] for any other remunerative services related to his daily business […]”, 
“[…]for consumption involving the payment of interests exceeding the limit for 
interests […]”,“[…]to demand any debtor to fulfill his monetary obligations by 
showing rude or violent statement or behavior or by visiting or telephoning in an 
embarrassing way […], 
 
 and the like. In the section 8 of article 9 attention is paid to bōryokudan members’ demands 
in regards to financing business, and money lending against people will, or on preferential 
treatments. Other sections of the same article aim at yakuza involvement in vacating buildings 
against people’s will; against properties’ occupation and consequent showing off of names, or 
gangs’ authority, demanding to whoever owns, or has interests in the said property, to offer 
money or other valuables “[…]as a fee for surrendering or any other similar pretext in return 
for ceasing demonstration of dominance over the said land […]”.  The last two sections of the 
article focus on traffic accidents, prohibiting gangs’ members from being involved in settling 
amicably on losses and damage incurred during a given accident “[…]on a promise of 
compensation and to demand an offer of money and other valuables as a compensation for the 
loss and damage incurred […]”. Connected to the same circumstances, section 14 forbids 
yakuza from pretending loss or damages incurred in traffic accidents, or from exaggerating 
the extent of these, when it is not the case, demanding “[…]to offer money or other valuables 
by way of a compensation for loss or damage or on any other similar pretext, or to 
indiscriminately demand money and other valuables in compensation for damage or any other 
similar pretext, claiming that a loss has been incurred in selling, buying, and other induced 
transactions of goods […]”.  
 As asserted in the following Articles 10, 12-3, 12-5, law provisions do not address 
only to gang’s members but they are broadened also to people who ‘demand, request or 
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suggest designated gangsters to execute violent demanding acts’ (Article 10); designated 
gangsters who ‘demand, request or suggest any person to execute quasi-violent demanding 
acts related to the designated gang which the said designated gangster belongs to or related to 
the hierarchically superior designated gang.’ (Article 12-3); and to the people who fall under 
the items contained in Article 12.5, which prohibits ‘Quasi-violent Demanding Acts’, 
described by the law as ‘acts provided for in Article 9 conducted by a person other than 
gangsters belonging to a designated gang, taking advantage of the influence of the said 
designated gang or its hierarchically superior designated gang defined in the same article’. 
(Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991) 
 As for the measures against violent and quasi-violent demanding acts: regardless of 
whom did it, according to the law, when the Prefectural Public Safety Commission finds that 
any of the demanding acts violating the above mentioned provisions are committed, it may 
firstly order the perpetrator to stop the said acts, or if deemed necessary it may order 
appropriate actions. In case, the perpetrator is likely to further repeat the said acts, the 
Commission may order necessary actions to prevent them for a period no longer than one year.  
 In addition, the law address the Prefectural Public Safety Commission to provide 
assistance, including material, advice, instructions and short training courses, to business 
operators on how to deal with the unjust demands.  
To enable the Prefectural Public Safety Commission to prevent dangers to citizens’ life and 
assure their safety and protection (as purposes stated in Article 1), the law allows it to prohibit 
the designated gangsters, or gangs, to use their office. When the Commission believes certain 
circumstances to be a possible source of danger, it may order a ban to the office’s use for a 
period not longer than three months, with the possibility of extending the order, only once, for 
other three months. This restriction usually apply in case of gangs’ wars, among designated 
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groups, when different acts of violence, including use of lethal weapons, are perpetrated 
within, or aimed at, the said office. Office usage is also commonly forbidden when it is likely 
to be used, during gangs’ warfare, for: purposes of meetings for a large number of gangsters; 
conspiracy, leadership, giving orders or communication for the purpose of the said gangland 
war; the manufacture and storage of lethal weapons and other matters which are considered 
likely to be used for the said gangland war. Furthermore, representatives of designated gang 
are liable for the damages caused to third parties during gangs’ wars, involving the said 
designated gang.  
 According to the law, designated gang’s members are strictly forbidden to coerce or 
induce any person to affiliate to the said designated gang, or any other designated gang; they 
are forbidden to impede secession to the members; they shall not coerce or induce, any person, 
nor provide tools or money, to carry out yubitsume (finger-cutting ritual) and irezumi 
(tattooing). Designated groups’ members shall also not request, suggest, or assist, other 
designated members, or people, to carry out any of the above mentioned acts.  
 Facing the violations of any of these provisions, including the office’s restriction 
usage, the Prefectural Public Safety Commission may order the said designated gang’s 
member to stop, the said act, or take the necessary actions; if the perpetrator is found likely to 
repeat the violation of the act, the Commission may order actions necessary to the prevention, 
for a period no longer than one year.  
From the Art.31 on, the law focus on the promotion of the Anti-violence campaign, and other 
matters, that are not strictly linked to my research, therefore an overview can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Bōtaihō revisions 
 Since its implementation, the law has gone through several revisions, mostly due to 
the fact that yakuza adapted their business and activities so as to avoid, or elude, its provisions. 
The first revision was enacted in the 1993, focusing on four main changes. It stressed 
attention on the process of secession and rehabilitation of designated gangs’ members, 
prohibiting the obstruction to the secession by the organizations, including the finger-cutting 
ritual as a condition, or money compensation. The second change improved upon the 
juveniles’ recruitment; the third, encouraged the assistance to the members who wanted to 
leave the gangs, promoting campaigns among the public against the discriminations towards 
the former members; and, the last, increased the number of type of violent demands included 
in Article 9, adding the ban of yakuza’s involvement in stockbrokers’ business, companies’ 
share selling and compensation’s demands to leave premises, or remove gang paraphernalia. 
(Hill 2000) 
 It was edited for the second time in the 1997, with other five developments. Article 9 
was further broadened: ban of debts’ collection under unjust circumstances; prohibition of 
phone calls, visits, rough language or other kind of acts which would bother people, aimed to 
debts’ repayment. The second development regarded the addressee of the Prefectural Public 
Safety Commission injunctions: with the first edition, the law allowed injunctions only 
towards the perpetrator of the violent demanding act, while with revision, injunctions could 
be directed to the designated yakuza in authority positions over the lower-level lawbreakers. 
The integration of ‘quasi-violent demanding acts’ coincided with the measures carried out in 
this year, and it was due to the bōryokudan members’ evasion of the law; in direct connection 
with the latter, it was a widening of the provisions about the assistance for the victims of 
yakuza’s demands. And lastly, an improvement regarding the restriction of gang office’s 
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usage, before limited to inter-gang wars, now expanded also to intra-group conflicts. (Hill 
2000) 
 In the 2006 Bōtaihō revision, the focus was mainly on the prevention of the flow of 
financial resources from bōryokudan gangs, promoting the exclusion of the organizations in 
different business’ sectors such as stock markets, sporting circles and public works’ projects. 
(Hays 2009) 
 A further editing was carried out in 2008, when the Article 9 was stretched out to 
include a new clause as violent demanding act: the harassment and extortion of government 
officials. In addition, yakuza groups were made responsible for the economic damage caused 
by their activities; while gangs’ bosses were made liable for their subordinates’ acts in civil 
court. (Hays 2009 - Adelstein 2014) 
 The last edition of the anti-bōryokudan law dates back to the 2012, and its main 
development was the strengthening of regulations against bōryokudan. Due to the continuous 
turf wars, for the citizens’ sake, was introduced the criminalization of the establishment of 
new gangs’ offices, as well as the prowling around the neighborhood of the rival members’ 
houses. The Prefectural Public Safety Commission was empowered with the chance to impose 
stricter regulations on the business of the gangs labelled as repeat attackers: thanks to this 
measure, labelled members can be arrested as soon as they extort contribution as protection 
money, when demand participation in public works projects, and when they make any kind of 
unlawful requests. Finally, due to the fear of reprisals, citizens kept on hesitate to file lawsuit 
against bōryokudan offices’ usage, so this revision enable authorized Prefectural Centers to 
file lawsuit on behalf of people’s demanding injunctions. (Hays 2009 – Mangoni 2012 – 
White paper on police 2012) 
Following the anti- bōryokudan law 
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During the years following the implementation of the Bōtaihō, other laws have been 
issued, not only on local basis by Japanese authorities, but also at international level. While 
the Bōtaihō pays attention mainly on the “relationships” between gangs and people, and the 
related activities (as we have seen: extortion, protection money, traffic accidents and so on), 
those other provisions, even if not strictly directed to the yakuza in their statements, aim to 
weaken gangs’ other activities, sources of income, and more in general the organizations 
themselves (a list of those measures can be found in the appendix). These are the cases for 
instance of racketeering, money-laundering; measures to improve the control of organized 
crime, such as the introduction of interception methods; a new gun law; better conditions for 
witnesses, encouraging them to cooperate. And finally, several provisions with the goal of 
keeping the yakuza out of the community have been enacted, like in the case on banks being 
forbidden to extend loans to organized crime, and later on, the prohibition to let gangs’ 
members to open bank accounts. Similar measures have been taken by insurance companies, 
and to a greater degree, the purpose of yakuza confinement out of the community is dealt with 
the new implemented Prefectural Ordinances, which ban yakuza commercial relations with 
the societies’ members, even within gangs’ legal business. Moreover, lately more attention 
has been paid to bōryokudan, on international level, recognizing the threat of the yakuza 
changing more and more from organized crime in transnational organized crime. 
 In 2009 the Saga region (Kyushu) was the first to adopt the prefectural Ordinance. The 
Ordinance decreed criminal organizations’ affiliates’ expulsion from the prefectural territory. 
Following Saga, all the 47 prefectures of Japan have enacted analogous Ordinances: these 
carry the same purpose, but are slightly differentiated in their content depending on the local 
situation. The main goal is to isolate bōryokudan members through the ban of their 
commercial relations with the societies’ members, even within yakuza legal business. Police 
encourages companies to break their ties with organizations’ activities, stressing the risk, in 
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case of refusal, to suffer public opinion and consequent loss of reputation. Following the 
Ordinances’ promulgation, yakuza had no longer access to public works’ projects; denied 
chances to open new offices; printer shops were enabled to refuse to print bōryokudan’s 
business cards; as well as, hotel were enabled to cancel reservations when they find out 
yakuza presence behind them. (Mangoni 2012) The contract’s recommended exclusionary 
clause, addresses to organized crime members and clarifies that yakuza are not allowed to stay 
in a certain hotel (if it is the case); or, more in general, that their involvement is not wanted in 
said activity signed up in the contract. (Adelstein 2011) 
 On October 1
st
 2011 Ordinances came into effect in the last two prefectures: Tokyo 
and Okinawa. The東京都暴力団排除条例 Tōkyōto bōryokudan haijo jōrei (Tokyo’s 
prefecture organized crime exclusionary ordinance), vary in details but basically follows the 
same principle of the ones of the other provinces, criminalizing sharing profits with the 
bōryokudan or paying them off. People who are caught doing business with yakuza, or paying 
protection money, will not be victims anymore, in addition as lawbreakers of the new 
ordinance, they will be treated as criminals. The first time someone get caught may be just 
warned, then his name will be made public, and further penalties include fines or 
imprisonment. Foreign firms are not exceptions inasmuch this ordinance extent its provisions 
to all the companies operating within Tokyo. One peculiarity of Tokyo’s Ordinance is that it 
contains a clause ‘do tell, and we won’t ask’ (Adelstein 2011) which implies that if the person 
go to the police and confess that he has been involved with the yakuza, before they go to said 
person, police will help him to severe relations, without any penalty occurrence (exception is 
made for involvement with yakuza as means of threatening people). Among the basic 
measures towards the elimination of gangs’ activities there are: bōryokudan exclusion from 
public works’ bidding; the support for training and education of youth, so that they will not 
end up filling yakuza ranks; a further promotion for the separation from the gang; 
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strengthening of police force to better protect citizens from yakuza fighting repercussions. 
The role of the people according to the Ordinance are: to provide guidance and advice to 
youths, to avoid their joining the gangs, or becoming yakuza victims; to strive against any 
kind of involvement of crime organizations in festival, fireworks supplies, and the like; to 
make sure when signing a contract that the other party is not a member or gang’s affiliated; to 
insert organized crime exclusionary clause in companies’ contracts. Yakuza have been further 
forbidden by the ordinance to: open new offices, or operate in the old ones, in a 200 meters 
extended area around school premises; introduce youths into gang’s offices without a good 
reason; carry out any form of extortion, or blackmail; use other people’s name to conceal 
gangsters’ involvement; and ban to ask payoffs for services supply, including the use of the 
gang power to offer protection.  
 To sum up: in this chapter we have gone through the anti-bōryokudan law enacted in 
the 1992, its revisions, and the recent prefectural ordinances last implemented in 2011 in 
Tokyo and Okinawa. From this overview, it can be said that while America (in the RICO 
statute) clearly states the purpose to eradicate organized crime in the US, the measures taken 
by the Japanese government against organized crime carry the goal of isolating bōryokudan 
members from the society, breaking the connections between the common citizens and the 
gangs’ members on business level, and within both legitimate and non-legitimate activities, 
with the greater goal of driving the illegal business to the extinction. In the next chapter we 
are going to see what happened to yakuza organizations, and activities, during the years from 
the 1992 and the 2012, while the provisions included in this chapter were being enacted.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 During the years of the Bubble Economy, as seen in the first chapter, yakuza reached 
the highest levels of power on both grounds, economic and political. At a later stage, with the 
Bubble collapse they gradually lost that power, together with the decrease in tolerance from 
society which changed the conditions of bōryokudan members’ lives. In addition, the 
government decided to take serious measures against organized crime as we have seen in the 
previous chapters, beginning with the implementation of the Bōtaihō in the 1992. In this 
chapter, attention will be paid to what happened to yakuza organizations, what changes 
occurred, in regard of their affiliation, their activities, and their business, during the given 
period, from the 1992 and the 2012, bearing in mind the above mentioned changes in the 
economic and legal surroundings.  
 First of all, through statistical data, taken from the White Papers on Crime and the 
White Papers on Police (published on the NPA websites, by the NPA and the Ministry of 
Justice MOJ), I am going to look at whether or not, and how, the numbers changed during the 
years, displaying an increase, or decrease, in bōryokudan involvement in the different 
offences. To avoid an endless list of digits, I am going to take into account mainly the 
Japanese version of  the White Paper on Crime of 1993, which reports data of the 1992, hence 
the year of the Bōtaihō enactment; the White Paper on Crime of the 2010, which reports data 
of the 2009, hence one year after the latest revision, not considering the revision of the 2012 
because those data would overstep the time gap considered in this work; and the White Paper 
on Crime of the 2013 which reports data of the 2012. To follow, using secondary literature I 
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am going to report other data and information which also show a part of what has been going 
on within the yakuza world.  
Statistics from the National Police Agency (NPA) and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
 The main focus within these statistics will be on the most typical yakuza activities 
(gambling, extortion, prostitution, drug offences and weapon offences), but also other 
offences such as homicide, assault, robbery, theft and scam are going to be taken in 
consideration since the number is relatively significant. Moreover, homicide and assault may 
be further considered part of the extortion business, as a display of intimidation and threats, 
ended up in the wrong way, carried out by the gangs’ members.   
1. Gambling_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for gambling were less than 3000, decreasing to 124 in 
2009, and to 52 in 2012.  
2. Extortion_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for extortion were about 4000; reduced to 900 in 2009, 
and to 649 in 2012. 
3. Prostitution_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for prostitution were around 300; while in 2009, 
members arrested for the violation of the Anti-Prostitution Act were 42; and 27 in 2012.  
4. Drug offences_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for drug offences were about 6500; in 2009, 
organized crime arrestees for the violation of Stimulants Control Law were 1965; and 1543 in 
2012. 
5. Weapon offences_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for weapon offences were around 1600; in 2009, 
gangs’ members arrested for the violation of the Sword and Firearms Control Law were 254; 
going down to 143 in 2012. 
6. Homicide_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for homicide were about 250; going down in 2009 to 77, 
and decreasing even more to just 14 in 2012. 
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7. Simple assault_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for simple assault were almost 5000; going down to 
around 1200 in 2009; decreasing to only 879 in 2012. 
8. Aggravated assault_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for aggravated assault were around 1800; in 
2009 considerably decreased to 367; followed by another slight decrease in 2012 to 345.  
9. Robbery_ In 1992 yakuza arrested for robbery were around 300. In 2009 they decreased to 96, 
and in 2012 to 51. 
10. Theft_ On theft offences no data were found regarding the 1992, but yakuza arrestees were 
750 in 2009, and 561 in 2012.  
11. Scam _ The same goes for scam offences, no data were found in regards of the 1992; in 2009 
gangs’ members arrested were 904, and 945 in 2012.  
From this overview it can easily be seen an high grade of reduction in yakuza members’ 
arrestees. The immediate conclusion that may be drawn is that gangs’ illegitimate activities 
have consequently decreased. The same can be said if we look at the total number of the 
gangs’ members in the same years: 90.600 in the 1992; 80.900 in the 2009; and 63.200 in 
2012.  
Nevertheless, as we will see in the next sections of the chapter, there are some people who 
believes that actually yakuza illegal activities are not ceasing, indeed they are moving towards 
other directions, and taking new shapes, as for instance the thought, supported by Rankin 
2012, of the trend among the organizations of moving deeper underground. Accordingly, if 
this is the case, “official” data from the statistics would show just one side of the reality, and 
since the subject is organized crime, hence organizations which work mainly in the 
illegitimate business, it is not totally wrong to think that data may not display the actual 
situation. This point will be further discussed later, in the “discussion” section. 
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Yakuza population 
An important change should be noted in regard of the yakuza population. Bōryokudan 
members are classified in two groups, the構 成 員 kōsei-in and the 総数構 成 員 jun kōsei-in. 
The kōsei-in are the official members, those registered on the organizations’ member list; 
while the jun kōsei-in are non-regular members, who are associated to yakuza: they make use 
organizations’ influence; cooperate with bōryokudan; and are often involved in yakuza 
business, in crime committing as well as funds and arms providing (Nakamura 2007). What is 
worth noting is that during those years, there has been a switch between the number of 
members belonging to these two groups. Indeed, in 1992 there were 56.600 official members 
and 34.000 unofficial (or associated) out of the total 90.600; in 2009, the total 80.900 were 
divided in 38.600 kōsei-in and 42.300 jun kōsei-in; and finally, the 2012 data count 28.800 
kosei-in against 34.400 jun kōsei-in, displaying a sharp reversal of the 1992 tendency (平成 
５年版 犯罪白書, 1993-平成２２年版 犯罪白書, 2010-平成 25年版 犯罪白書, 2013). 
Regarding the affiliation to the several organizations, as we have seen in chapter one, due to 
the police crackdown before the implementation of the Bōtaihō, and the new provisions that 
followed, including the anti-bōryokudan law itself, yakuza found themselves being pushed 
out of their offices; out of their banks; out of their usual business with people, even out of the 
legitimate activities used as cover; they found themselves pushed out from their own society. 
Therefore the organizations, in particular the smaller and weaker ones, to protect themselves 
adopted more and more the tendency to form alliances, and affiliations, with the bigger and 
more powerful gangs. As a result, the three groups –Yamaguchi-gumi, Sumiyoshi-kai and 
Inagawa-kai-, which were already enjoying a certain degree of supremacy (beginning from 
the 1970s), grew further, accounting today for almost the three-quarters of the total yakuza 
population. The Yamaguchi-gumi remains the biggest syndicate, still keeping 44% share of 
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the market in 2011 (Adelstein April 2011). Recently, it seems that because of blood relations, 
the Inagawa-kai is also passed under the Yamaguchi-gumi control; the biggest yakuza 
organization now has the monopoly on more than half of all the yakuza in Japan. (Adelstein 
April 2011) 
Moreover, in accord with the principle of survival, since 2008, after the revision of the 
Bōtaihō that made gangs’ bosses liable to civil compensations for damages caused by 
subordinates, the Yamaguchi-gumi has incremented the偽装破門 gisō hamon (fake 
expulsion) practice. The syndicate increased the number of dismissed members, who are those 
formally expelled from the gangs in accordance with the standard yakuza protocol: the details 
of the dismissed are sent to the police and the other gangs, who are requested to treat the ex-
members as civilians from then on. Among the analysts there is the suspect that most of these 
dismissals, around 2.000 per year by the Yamaguchi-gumi, are false, and that they are used as 
an expedient to avoid the connections with the organizations while the ex-members keep on 
working for the syndicate. (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012) 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Rankin, all these numbers refers only to the known yakuza 
members, when it is reasonable to believe that an increasing number of unknown members 
are becoming active, following the just mentioned trend of the gisō hamon practice (Rankin 
Feb. 13, 2012). This supposed increasing of secrecy and invisibility could be in accord with 
the theory of gangs going deeper underground. 
Construction Industry 
The construction industry, has been one among the yakuza business for a long time. A 
2007 survey of 3.000 construction firms conducted by the NPA on yakuza activity in the 
construction industry, indicated a decline in bōryokudan involvement in this sector. Two-third 
of the respondents, who were asked whether or not had received improper demands from a 
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yakuza-connected contractor within the past twelve months, answered that they had not heard 
of any connections between construction firms and gangs in that area within the last five years. 
Apparently, yakuza organizations still maintain control of at least one third of the construction 
industry. Moreover, according to Rankin’s paper, bōryokudan have slightly shifted their 
attention to activities such as demolition work, debris-removal, asbestos-removal, and waste 
disposal, which are in direct connection with the construction industry, and that are strictly 
subjected to regulations which drive up the services’ costs. Yakuza involved in this new 
business, simply elude regulations like company licenses, safety measures, training for 
workers, permits to dump waste, employing foreign migrant workers and dumping potentially 
toxic waste illegally in remote rural areas. In doing so, they are able to supply for the same 
services of a legal company, to a very low prices. (NPA 2007 in Rankin Feb. 13, 2012) 
Moreover, it seems that a good half of the 2011 shooting incidents occurred at construction 
companies, including the one which murdered a construction company president in Fukuoka 
on November; and the shooting, outside his office, of the deputy chief of the Fukuoka branch 
of the Federation of Civil Engineering Unions on January 2012. (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012) 
Introduction in clean-up and rebuilding projects 
Following the Tohoku tsunami and earthquake on March 2011, reports on yakuza 
activities connected to these disasters were opposing. On one side, gangs’ members offered 
assistance and support: they sent food and emergency supplies; according to Rankin paper, 
some men also believed, that at the time, yakuza were handing out envelopes containing 
money. But on the other side, where destruction comes, need for clean-up and rebuilding 
projects follow: yakuza took full advantage of the situation. Due to the precarious situation, 
there was little space left to care about papers and credentials, and bōryokudan easily 
managed to start their business there. It seems that they picked up men off the street, 
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supplying laborers to nuclear plants. The work of yakuza labor-broker, in theory, does not 
involve any scam: indeed, they just negotiate the wages of the laborers with the industry 
recruiter (usually high wages), and deduct a commission out of it, leaving the rest to the 
workers. For instance, at Fukushima Nuclear Plant No.1 there was an high demand for 
laborers, who should have worked in very dangerous conditions: according to one journalist, 
10% of the men who arrived to work on the site were provided by yakuza brokers (Suzuki 
2011:40-1 in Rankin Feb. 13, 2012). Moreover, while usually there is a strict control on 
personnel entering nuclear power plants, Fukushima Nuclear Plant No. 1 was not the case, 
and yakuza brokers’ laborers entered the site without anyone caring about: one subcontractor, 
reported in Rankin paper, even admitted that they kept regular skilled laborers in safe areas, 
sending unskilled yakuza laborers to the most dangerous spots (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012). 
Use of violence 
 According to the data from the NPA and MOJ in the first part of the chapter, the 
yakuza’s use of violence has declined. Bōryokudan organizations are considered among the 
least murderous crime gangs in the world today (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012:6). Although there is 
still the presence of violence use, like in the cases reported below, most problems lately come 
from the Kudō-Kai organization in Fukuoka.  
 In March 2000, a telephone dating club was firebombed in Kobe, where four people 
died; it is presumed that the attack was carried by a faction of the Yamaguchi to which the 
club refused to pay protection money, because it was already paying another faction of the 
same gang. (The New York Times - April 2000) 
In 2007 in Nagasaki, the city’s mayor was shot to death in front of everyone at the main train 
station. Even though the murderer, a member of a local branch of the Yamaguchi-gumi, has 
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confessed, the motive remained unclear, but the police suspected a dispute over public works 
projects. (The New York Times- April 2007) 
In 2008, the Dojinkai, top yakuza gang for long time, was brought to court by 600 resident 
who wanted them out of their neighborhood in Kurume. According to the Dojinkai leaders, 
who willing sat down for a 90-min interview, they have always lived peacefully and 
respectfully with the neighbors; and believed that some outsider were taking advantage of 
their internal conflict to get them out. (The New York Times 2008) 
The Kudō-Kai 
In October 2012, in Kita-Kyushu a woman has been chased on her way home, by a 
supposed gang member swinging a machete; both, her and the taxi driver who tried to help, 
were injured. The incident is directly connected to the recent affixed sign on the entrance of 
the woman’s bar ‘No yakuza allowed’. (Asahi Shimbun Oct. 23,2012) Cited in the same 
articled, the case of a bar owner who goes to work in sneakers, instead of heels, to be ready to 
run if necessary. 
Apparently the prefecture of Fukuoka is the base of the Kudō-Kai, considered the most 
violent gang of the century. Many incidents have been caused by this group over the past 10 
years, including firebombs, shooting, vandalism, use of grenades thrown in offices or houses 
of companies and individuals who dare to refuse their demands. When Fukuoka’s citizens 
grouped to protest against the Kudō-Kai, the chief organizer was shot and injured; while a 
grenade was thrown in the group’s office. The Kudo-kai attacked the house of the Prime 
Minister Abe; in a court case of 2008, prosecutors lost all their witnesses, except for one, 
because they had been threaten with retaliation, in case of testimony against the gang. In 
another court case, fearing jury intimidation, for the first time since the reintroduction of the 
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jury system in Japan in 2009, the trial was entrusted to a single presiding judge. Despite all 
this, the kudo-kai has not yet been punished. (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012) 
In an interview to the captain of one of the Kudō-Kai’s sub-groups, Mr. Kimura, the 
man denied the involvement of Kudo-kai behind the recent violence, although he admitted the 
chance of the work of individual gang members. Mr. Kimura said that due to the recent 
restrictions, Kudō-Kai economic deals have been hurt, without going into further details. 
During the interview, he added that the police was in part responsible for this violence, trying 
to separate the kudo-kai from the community; in this regard, he affirmed “If they crush us, 
organized crime will just become harder to see, and more violent, like in Mexico […]” (The 
New York Time –February 2012). 
From yakuza to mafia 
Although there are many, especially among the older members, who want to preserve 
the traditional yakuza ways of being and doing business, it doesn’t look like things are going 
that way. In an interview, one yakuza boss said  
“If the police are going to harass everyone like this just for being yakuza, or just for 
being associated with yakuza, then we might as well become a secret society like the 
Mafia. Everything would be better for us that way: the police wouldn’t be able to use 
the Anti-Yakuza Law on us , and if one of our boys gets busted he won’t get a longer 
sentence just because he’ s a yakuza.” (Rankin Feb. 20, 2012:8) 
 
In his 2003 book, Hill already argued the possibility of categorizing yakuza groups as 
mafias, concluding that “[…]the yakuza are indeed the Japanese mafia becomes one 
justifiable not purely on the theoretical grounds of their provision of protection, but in terms 
of their increasingly and unambiguously sociopathic behavior.” (Hill 2003: 276). Miyazaki 
Manabu, an advocate of the rights of yakuza gangs to exist and operate, says, “By reducing 
the range of legal activities available to the yakuza, the Anti-Yakuza Law has actually had the 
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effect of encouraging them to evolve into mafia-like syndicates (Miyazaki 2007:349, in 
Rankin Feb. 13, 2012:8). In addition, the Japanese tabloids have devoted considerable space 
to the ‘mafia-ization’ of the yakuza (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012:8). It seems that in the recent years, 
yakuza have been more mafia-oriented organizations, meaning that although they kept their 
traditional facades, their activities are changing, moving towards more hidden and insidious 
crimes. Characterized in general by the tendency to go deeper underground, this new kind of 
gangsters exemplified in the Kudō-Kai and their business features: the rise of aggressive 
loansharking schemes, white collar crimes, robberies, and financial scams that directly target 
the public. Together with the increase of secrecy and invisibility, several yakuza cultural traits, 
as we have seen in chapter one, are disappearing. The finger-cutting ritual is almost extinct. 
The tattoo have acquired quite a different meaning: first of all, is not anymore a yakuza 
signifier, but is being gradually accepted at every level of the society; full-body tattoos are 
less popular, now they are more oriented towards arms’ or backs’ tattoo, or none. (Rankin Feb. 
13, 2012).  
Corporate world 
Following Rankin paper, it seems that although since the 1980s gangs’ members are 
still involved on a certain degree in sōkaiya (corporate blackmail) and jiage (the persuasion of 
landowners to sell their properties), today yakuza business in the corporate world has changed. 
Kinyuya, for instance, are corporate money-lenders who accept shares as guarantee on huge 
loans. The financial supporter companies of the kinyuya are often yakuza organizations’ fronts’ 
companies. Other two new types of activities are the keizaigoro and the yakara. The 
keizaigoro are extortionists who advice on supposedly valuable investments, and then require 
payment in return. The yakara are speculators who artificially inflate stock prices to gain 
short term revenues.  
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Within the corporate world, there is one activity from which, even though they tried, 
they didn’t manage to expel yakuza presence: real estate and stock market. One investigator, 
reported in Rankin, admitted the difficulty in spotting the yakuza operators in the field: indeed, 
bōryokudan front companies help them to build corporate relations, to win credibility with 
banks, to filter criminal profits into the upper world, or to evade tax, enabling  them to keep 
on with their extortion rackets at corporate level (NHK 2008, in Rankin Feb. 13, 2012). A 
common trick used by the yakuza to buy shares is that of using other people’s names, often 
the ones of homeless people who in return are paid with an apartment and a steady job. Some 
bōryokudan offices have a ‘dealing room’, filled with computers used for stock-trading using 
false identities. In this way, the illicit revenues deriving from the organized crime illegal 
business flow into Japan’s stock market (Rankin Feb. 13, 2012).  
Up until now we have learned that within yakuza organizations there has been a 
decrease in the use of violence (according to the NPA and MOJ data), with some surge in 
connection with the Kudō-Kai gang activities. According to the White Papers on Crime data 
of yakuza arrestees, each of the offences reported has gone through a significant decrease, 
except maybe for scam offences which present a slight increase. Regarding the number of the 
organizations’ members, data show a decrease since the 1992 to the 2012, even though it is 
not so striking as in the arrestees’ case; moreover, a reversal in the proportion between the 
number of official and non-regular members has been noted. Furthermore, we have seen how 
yakuza presence is still rooted within the construction industry, and the corporate world, and 
the theory among some experts of a supposed ‘mafia-ization’ of the organizations. In the 
following section I am going to look at these information in connection with the goals which 
the provisions analyzed in chapter 2 aim at, to see whether or not, those measures are working 
accordingly to their purposes. 
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Discussion  
Since the 1992, with the enactment of the anti-bōryokudan law, till the 2012 (time gap 
on which this work has been conducted), several law, and measures, have been implemented 
to fight organized crime in Japan. Among those provisions, none actually states in its purpose 
“to eradicate the yakuza”, but generally they aim at the control of bōryokudan intimidation 
and violent acts, and at their isolation from the society, banning, among the others, yakuza 
commercial relations with the societies’ members.  
According to the results within bōryokudan organizations that we have seen in the previous 
sections, it seems that in part the laws may be actually working as supposed to: indeed, use of 
violence has decreased, as well as gangs’ members’ arrestees. Nevertheless, there are still 
some matters to be addressed. First of all, the fact that yakuza arrestees are decreased does not 
mean that their involvement in given activities has been reduced. Indeed, the above mention 
practice of dismissing members, and the “activation” of unknown members, may correspond 
to arrestees in the category of “non-gangsters” criminals. Moreover, even though it decreased, 
the number of members of yakuza organizations is still quite high, it means that they have to 
be involved in some kind of business if they want to survive. Regarding the isolation from the 
society, it seems again as in different matters around the yakuza that the issue is contrasting. 
On one side, the new century has seen the emergence of anti-yakuza campaigns, with a great 
commitment of the citizens who carried them out in close cooperation with the police. 
Citizens’ groups distribute posters and pamphlets, they advertise their activities on radio 
stations, run advisory services; at the same time, the police gives instructions on how to deal 
with gangs, visiting business, factories, town halls and temples. There have been civic anti-
yakuza demonstrations, and even cases of people confronting directly gangs’ members with 
loud demonstrations in front of their office (Rankin Feb. 20, 2012). But on the other side, 
according to Rankin, it can be said that the real factor, triggering those campaigns is not 
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strictly connected to yakuza use of violence, but more money-oriented. For instance, the 
presence of gangs’ offices affects house prices in the surrounding area, or make property more 
difficult to sell; or, the chance of yakuza introducing protection rackets in a given area, 
worries owners of unlicensed bar, sex clubs, and these kind of business, who have most to 
lose. This thought can be confirmed by the fact that in the cases when anti-yakuza campaigns 
are successful, they do not force yakuza to disband, but to move somewhere else. On the 
gangs’ side, relocation may result very annoying, but it does not impede the development of 
their activities, nor reduce their presence. 
According to Rankin, and his sources, the effect of this campaign is resulting in driving 
yakuza “[…]toward greater secrecy, duplicity, and ruthlessness, thereby potentially worsening 
the overall situation. […]” (Rankin Feb. 20, 2012:3). In addition to the other factors that seem 
pointing in this direction: the reversal in official and non-regular members’ number.  
One consequence of the provisions implemented during those years is the growth of 
the Yamaguchi-gumi, which now has under its control more than half of the yakuza world. If 
on one side this huge growth has made the syndicate too powerful, it is also true that it has 
made it harder to control. The first signs of a control decline have already been seen in 2005 
when the Kodo-kai took over control of the Yamaguchi-gumi. They started to not follow the 
unwritten rules always existing between yakuza and police. A part from the less significant 
acts, such as end of cooperation with the law enforcement, or no confession of crimes, more 
serious is the fact that they started to gather information, and pictures, of police officers and 
their family. Police was not happy when they found out. According to Adelstein, when 
organized crime challenges the police authority, it is a clear sign that they are out of control. 
Even a former yakuza boss admitted “We have always existed with the tacit recognition of the 
police and the government. When we challenge the cops, we really did become outlaws. The 
Kodo-kai ruined it for us all”. (Adelstein March 2011) 
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Among the experts within the yakuza field, there are different opinions in regards of 
the outcomes of the laws’ implementation on yakuza organizations. In his 2004 paper Hill 
stated: 
One certainty is that Japan’s illegal markets will not disappear therefore guaranteeing 
the existence of organized crime. While the yakuza will be profoundly changed by 
wider social, political and economic developments, it is unlikely that they will 
disappear any time soon. While recent legal developments have adversely affected the 
yakuza, continued evidence of links between senior political figures and yakuza 
members means we must be deeply skeptical as to the commitment of Japan’s political 
elite to serious, proactive organized crime countermeasures. (Hill 2004:113) 
 
According to the 2007 Nakamura’s paper, there were serious skepticisms regarding the 
effects of the anti- bōryokudan law’s implementation. Indeed, during the years between the 
1992 and the 2007, the huge number of arrests carried out, showed an increase in the arrestees 
for violent crime, with a sharp decreased of Yakuza presence among them. At the time the 
critics said  
Because the Yakuza has been losing their influence over the underworld, violent crime, 
not committed by the Yakuza but committed by other hoodlums, foreigners in 
particular, has significantly increased. In other words, the underworld in Japan is 
losing its power balance” (Nakamura 2007:124). 
 
Both the works of Hill and Nakamura date back to the time when the most significant law 
enactment was the Bōtaihō, which still had to go through other revisions in the following 
years. More recent are the evaluations of Atsushi Mizoguchi and Mangoni. In an interview of 
the 2011, Mizoguchi  has been asked about the presumed effectiveness of the ordinances’ 
enforcement. He answered firstly pointing out that the ordinances are going to penalize just 
the citizens; then he added: 
The Anti-Gang Law that went into force in 1992 failed to root out the ambiguities that 
existed in Japan. It is absurd to expect that law, or the new ordinances that have just 
gone into effect, will eradicate the yakuza. While I don’t have the actual figures, I am 
certain the organized crime sections in the police have increased their manpower. I 
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would say the maintaining of such numbers are the police’s subtle way of indicating 
they still want the bōryokudan to stick around. (Japantoday Oct. 2011) 
 
 He also stressed “If Japan were to modify its Criminal Code to state, “Organized crime 
groups are forbidden,” it would be simple. I suppose that would be the only way to get rid of 
them”. He continued: 
Since the first eradication campaign by the police in 1964, nearly 50 years have passed, 
and despite up and down fluctuations in the total number of gang members, the yakuza 
have barely budged an inch. They have even improved their situations through better 
organizing. This has also led to the three major syndicates that were once local 
organizations—the Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai and Sumiyoshi Rengo—taking 
over more territory and focusing their strengths. (Japantoday Oct. 2011) 
 
 Concluding that  
I think the ultimate fate of the gangs has already been sealed. This will come about not 
through the results of police investigations or dragnets, but simply in synch with the 
decline of the Japanese economy. Since the gangs are a parasite that lives off the 
economy, when that economy slumps, the gangs’ economy will necessarily decline as 
well. That’s all there is to it. (Japantoday Oct. 2011) 
 
 On the same line of thoughts is Mangoni, who in his paper “The 'Yakuza' and the 
freezing of assets by the Americans” concludes: 
[…]The Yakuza appears to be still too well rooted in the social body to think that the 
organization can be completely liquidated in the very near future. Finally, it should be 
noted that unlike the numerous criminal organization operating in other Countries, the 
Yakuza groups have never been in open conflict with the Japanese State. Rarely 
endangering the lives of the citizens, they are still tolerated by the social body, even if 
less than decades ago. They reign over a grey zone of the society, trying to influence, 
through arbitration in the corridors, the operation of the business system and 
manipulation of the sector of political representation.” (Mangoni 2012:81) 
 
Kuchikomi in his article is of the same opinion, stating that: 
[…]I think the ultimate fate of the gangs has already been sealed. This will come about 
not through the results of police investigations or dragnets, but simply in synch with 
the decline of the Japanese economy. Since the gangs are a parasite that lives off the 
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economy, when that economy slumps, the gangs’ economy will necessarily decline as 
well. That’s all there is to it. (Kuchikomi 2011) 
 
Finally, to conclude it seems to me that the provisions implemented between the 1992 
and the 2012, have worked successfully in reducing the display, and use, of violence and 
intimidation by the yakuza, and this goes perfectly in accord with the stated aim of the 
Bōtaihō. Regarding the illegitimate activities in which yakuza are involved, even though the 
significant decrease in gangs’ members arrestees connected to these offences, it cannot be 
said for sure the extent of influence exerted by the laws’ implementations, because there are 
other issues to be considered, as the economic factors, considered, by the above mentioned 
experts, as a crucial element in sealing the gangs’ fate; and the theory that see yakuza 
organizations moving underground, followed by an increasing secrecy and invisibility. About 
the prefectural ordinances, as explained in the introduction, it may be a bit early to draw 
conclusions on their effects because of the short time since their implementation, but from the 
information gathered, it can be said that even though they may be working in breaking 
commercial legitimate relations with citizens, they are not going to prevent people from 
“demanding services” to organized crime. As quoted in Rankin 2012:  
The fact is, when you’ve got a problem that no one else can solve – not the police, not 
your lawyer, your agent, your company, or whatever – at times like that there are 
people who can apply a bit of pressure and solve it for you.  Pressure groups, and, well 
okay, people in the underworld…. Even though you know it’s wrong, sometimes it’s 
the only way to get your problem sorted out.” (Fuji TV, 2011 in Rankin Feb. 20, 
2012:7) 
 
Furthermore,  
As is well known, yakuza gangs are the largest criminal organizations in Japan. They 
infest every region of the country, using violence to intimidate the public. It cannot be 
denied, however, that, due to confusion over noble-sounding words such as giri and 
the ninjo, there is a pernicious tendency in our society to tolerate the existence of these 
gangs, or to regard them as exciting and exotic (NPA 2007a:1 in Rankin Feb. 20, 
2012). 
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 Today, according to Rankin, few Japanese accept this view of the gangs. However, it seems 
that even though people are well-aware of the real nature of the yakuza, as organized crime, it 
“[…]does not preclude a degree of respect for their achievements. […]” (Rankin Feb. 
20,2012:7). 
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Conclusion 
 
 To conclude: none of the provisions, and implementation of existing laws, enacted 
between the 1992 and the 2012, actually talked about the eradication of the yakuza, but they 
refer to the control, or the confinement, of bōryokudan who as we have seen, had broken the 
unwritten social contract of leaving the citizens out of their business and wars. Yakuza did in 
the past, and still do now, occupy a place within the Japanese society, they have a role that the 
Japanese judicial system unconsciously guarantee them. Most of their activities as problem-
solvers and enforcers are due to lacks, or too expensive, or simply malfunctioning, legal 
system. This is the reason why the minbō originated in the first place. On the same line, 
bōryokudan success in stock market derives from inadequacy of the rules which should keep 
them out of it; blackmailing would not exist if there was nothing to use against corporations; 
and moneylending is strictly connected with dysfunction of job market, pension system, and 
savings and loans services.  
From the information I have gathered and worked with, I answer my research question, 
drawing the conclusion that the laws, implemented between the 1992 and the 2012, in part do 
what they are supposed to. Accordingly with the aim stated in the Art. 1 of anti-bōryokudan 
law “…it aim to the control of the intimidation and violence acts…”, positive outcomes have 
been observed, especially in the decrease of the violence use. As for the reduction of illegal 
activities in which yakuza are involved, effects are less evident, due to different reasons, as 
the ability of the gangs to easily move towards new kind of activities; the theory which 
support the increasing secrecy and invisibility of the organizations; and the reversal of the 
proportion of the numbers of official and non-regular members, followed by the possibility of 
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the existence of unknown members, and the increase in the adoption of the “fake expulsion” 
practice. Finally, in regard of the prefectural ordinances: considering the short time since their 
implementation, apparently they are working in accord with their purpose of keeping yakuza 
out from legal business relations with the citizens, but until there is a demand for “problems 
that no one else can solve”, organized crime activities will never be totally legitimate, and 
yakuza will be isolate from the society only on the surface. 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 Oyabun-kobun structure_ The oyabun-kobun, or  father role- child role, is a 
relationship between the oyabun, the boss who has the function of protecting, advising 
and helping, the kobun, the subordinates, in return of their loyalty and services. 
 
 Yubitsume, or finger-cutting ritual, was used mainly as a punishment for acts that were 
not serious enough to deserve death. It consisted in a ceremony in which the top joint 
of the little finger is severed: the purpose of this punishment was that of weakening 
the hand’s grasp of the sword, meaning less independence and more need of boss’ 
protection. This ritual can also apply as form of apology, independently choose by the 
member, and in this case, the phalanx is wrapped in fine cloth and handed to the boss. 
Finger-cutting can occur more than once, in which case it is carried out on other 
fingers, or another joint of the first. (Kaplan and Dubro 2003) 
 
 Giri and the ninjo_ They are two concepts that came to be considered the core of 
yakuza’s code. Both embodied in the Bushidō, always taken in great consideration by 
the yakuza,  giri means strong sense of duty, and perfectly applies to the organizations 
believes because it carries the values of loyalty, gratitude, and moral debt; while ninjo, 
refers to human feelings, or emotion, and it is associated with generosity or sympathy 
toward the weak and the disadvantaged. Combined, the two concepts, mean 
‘obligation versus compassion’, thanks to that the ‘yakuza greatly enhanced their 
standing in society, showing that, like the best samurai, they could combine 
compassion and kindness with their martial skills’. (Kaplan and Dubro 2003)  
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 Irezumi, Japanese tattoo_ Tattoo were first a mark for the criminals, using different 
symbols in different places depending on the severity of the crime. At the same time, 
Japanese tattoo’s designs were considered to be the world’s finest, dating back 
hundreds of years; they are also mentioned in Chinese accounts of the third century. 
During the time, tattooing patterns became more complex; during the seventeenth 
century, full body tattoos characterized mainly gamblers and laborers who worked 
with their bodies exposed (carpenters, masons..). The Tokugawa tried periodically to 
ban the tattoos without any luck. Due to its traditional agonizing process, tattooing 
soon became a tool to test strength, often chose by bakuto to display their courage, 
toughness, and masculinity. Furthermore, having a tattoo also meant being marked as 
misfit, as someone who won’t be able anymore, or who choose not to, being part of 
the Japanese society. Indeed, the irezumi, became a practice deeper involved with the 
underworld. While it keeps on being a mark of great respect among yakuza, it also 
means exclusion from society, for instance tattooed people in Japan are not accepted 
in saunas and public baths to this day. (Kaplan and Dubro 2003)  
 
  1956 the Prostitution Prevention Law was enacted: described as a law “full of holes”, 
it is defined as “sexual intercourse with an unspecified other party for compensation or 
for a promise of compensation”, as pointed out by Hill ‘this means that any sexual 
services that exclude vaginal penetration fall outside the provisions of this law’ (Hill 
2003:114). 
 
 The yakuza and the police _Between police and yakuza there has always been a 
complicity, which has been reinforced by the close ties that gangs retain with the 
government, the same connection that exerted significant influence on the 
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legitimization of yakuza within the society. On one side, a number of Japanese police 
agents admired and identified with the giri  and ninjo, the two pillars of yakuza’s 
values; on the other side, yakuza have always respected the police and understood 
their duty of law enforcement.  
The close relationship between police and yakuza came to end around the early years 
of the 1990s for different reasons: the main cause has been the minbō; in addition 
yakuza filtering through Japanese society, authorities, and economy had gone too far, 
corruption and scandals which had followed made Japan realize the need of doing 
something.  
As police started to take actions against gangs, the inadequacy of the law enforcement 
system became clear: it seemed way too lenient versus the kind of activities yakuza 
usually deal with, such as hiding assets, impeding loan collection, bad-loan cases, and 
the like. Japanese system lacked in the basic tools, necessary to organized crime 
fighting and corruption, that most of the industrialized countries already had for long 
time: it lacked laws against racketeering or money laundering; it didn’t allow 
electronic surveillance or undercover operations and it didn’t provide for immunity to 
witnesses. Among the other reasons, those lacks in the system were due to the big 
amount of black money that the politicians were enjoying, together, or thanks to, their 
collaboration with organized crime (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
 
 European model and RICO statute: possible datum point_ The European model is 
rooted under the Napoleonic code of 1810, which has had great influence on those 
European countries usually considered examples of laws targeting criminal 
associations such as Italy, France and Germany. In this three nations, the law aims to 
the criminalization of the criminal gangs’ membership: the difficulty lays in defining 
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‘criminal association’ without stepping into the violations of free association rights. 
Moreover, this approach doesn’t really help when it comes to the actual eradication of 
organized crime. 
The American Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was 
enacted on October 15, 1970 clearly stating the purpose to eradicate organized crime 
in the US. What is significant of this approach is that it target the entire criminal gang, 
not the individual members, therefore an entire organized crime group can be 
prosecuted for the totality of its criminal activities. RICO statute also enable the 
seizure of the gangs’ assets gained through RICO violations; punishments can vary 
from a fine up to 25.000 dollars, to twenty years of prison, or a combination of both; 
moreover, it allows the victims of the given criminal organization to sue them and 
demand for damages and legal costs. Regardless these positive features, RICO has its 
criticism and problems as well, as for instance the need of sufficient evidence for a 
successful prosecution; the reliability of informers. To make it up for the lacks in the 
approach, witnesses’ protection system and electronic surveillance have been 
authorized, as well as controlled delivery, undercover operations and sting operations, 
but all this is under the strict surveillance of the competent authorities which have to 
give permissions and release warrants (usually limited in duration and scope). 
 
 The暴対法 Bōtaihō_ Overview of the thesis’ missing articles: 
 Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, provide the guideline to follow in the designation procedure. 
The Public Safety Commission cannot directly designate gangs, but it has to 
go through different steps. First comes a public hearing of statements, after the 
gang’s representative has being notified well in advance of the reason for the 
designation, and of the date and place of the hearing. At the hearing, the 
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gang’s representative, or his substitute, may express his opinion about the 
supposed designation, and bring evidence in the gang’s defense. In the case in 
which no representative of the said gang shows up, without any reason, or any 
chance of make notification, after 30 days the Commission may proceed to the 
designation without hearing of statements (Art. 5, Law No. 77 – May 15, 
1991).  
After the hearing, the Prefectural Public Safety Commission shall apply for a 
designation’s confirmation of the National Public Safety Commission, 
handing in documents which attest that the said gang meets the conditions for 
designation, together with a protocol of the held hearing of statements. The 
National Public Safety Commission shall hear the opinions of expert jurors, 
and then, based on those, decide whether or not the said gang meets the 
conditions for being designated. Once a decision is reached, Prefectural Public 
Safety Commission will be informed, and it will act in accordance, not 
designating the gang in case the National Public Safety Commission deem it 
not to be appropriate (Art. 6, Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991). Finally, a 
designation shall be effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette by 
the Prefectural Public safety Commission, who will also publish in the same 
any further change in the matter (Art. 7, Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991). The 
designation remains effective for three years, but it can be repealed in case of 
dissolution of the said gang(s), or in case it doesn’t meet anymore the 
conditions for designation. If the Commission retain the necessity for a repeal, 
it would have to go through the same process described above for the 
designation (Art. 8, Law No. 77 – May 15, 1991). 
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 From the Article 31 on, the law proceeds listing what people the Prefectural 
Public Safety Commission may nominate as members of the Anti-Violence 
Campaign Promotion Center; what kind of activities this Promotion Center 
should be involved with, which regard mostly counseling and consultation 
services for the community; information given; promotion for the acceptance 
of seceded members; and the like. 
In the last part, the Bōtaihō focuses on the way the Prefectural Public Safety 
Commission should act in particular cases: what orders to follow; some 
guidelines on delegation of power; and the last five Articles cite the penal 
provisions, in terms of years of penal servitude and/or amount of fines, 
deriving from the violation of the orders issued in the previous Articles.  
 
 Laws implemented between the 1992 and the 2012: 
 1991 Japan was the last among the G-7 nations to enact a money laundering law. 
 
 On December 23
rd
 1994, “Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against 
Organized Transnational Crime” was released by the UN. It recognizes the growing threat 
of organized crime, identifies organized transnational crime as a major concern of all 
countries, and it calls for a joint response from the international community. Delegates 
committed to an harder crackdown on organized crime in their own countries and a closer 
cooperation with the others. As reported in the article of The Washington Post “138 
nations join plan to fight crime”: ‘[…] The conference urged countries to tighten their 
laws to prevent criminal organizations from benefit from international loopholes. The 
declaration said that the new laws covering such thing as ‘criminal associations’ and 
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‘conspiracy’ also should be introduced where necessary to strengthen the hand of local 
law enforcers and ease international coordination. States also should exchange 
information and experience to increase the level of international cooperation.’ (The 
Washington Post, Nov. 24
th
 1994) 
 
 
 On March 1995 the Act for Prevention of Unlawful Activities by criminal gang members 
has been issued, aiming to the traditional racketeering; following the same purpose the 
revision to the commerce law in December 1997 banned the sokaiya (racketeers)’s pay off 
by large listed companies.  
 
 On August 18th 1999 three laws were enacted. The Law Concerning Punishment of 
Organized Crime, Control of Crime Proceeds and Other Matters, which focused on 
hardening punishments for those who were charged with organized crimes, targeting the 
individual who committed the crime (one of the eleven included in the Penal Code of 
1907) as a group activity, and punishing the said person as for an aggravated crime. This 
law also carried out more provisions for money-laundering, among the others it 
establishes the freezing measure making sure that property and value of the proceeded 
crime are confiscated, as well as it plans measures to run this confiscations within 
international cooperation. (Yoshinaka 1999) 
The second law promulgated in 1999 was the Interception of Communications for 
Criminal Investigation Act, which went into effect from August 1
st
. The main provision of 
the Act introduced the possibility of interception methods as part of the investigations: 
even though it was limited, it represented a big step forward. Only four types of organized 
criminal activities were allowed to be investigate with interceptions: those involving 
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drugs; guns; premeditated murders carried out by groups; and mass people smuggling into 
Japan. Interception was to be authorized by warrants, which last 10 days, and could be 
renewed on 10 days-basis, for no longer than 30 days. It contained further regulations for 
those involved in the use of interceptions; for those who may, or may not be, the targets of 
the interceptions; and the like. (Yoshinaka 1999) 
Finally, the third one was actually a revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1948, 
which enabled the judges to prohibit to ask questions about witness’ living and working 
places in court, in case of danger of retaliation from the people they are testifying against. 
(Yoshinaka 1999) 
 
 In 2006 the Money Lending Business Restriction Law was amended, making the penalty 
for un-registered business operations harder and establishing new penal provisions for 
high-interest-rate money lending.  
 
 In 2007 a new gun law was issued, fixing a maximum fine of 30 million of yen, and a 
prison sentence from 5 years to life, in case of gun-shooting on gangs’ behalf.  
 
 
 In 2008 an informal ban was addressed to yakuza appearance on television (Adelstein 
April 2011). In November of the same year the Japanese Bank Association worked out a 
model clause prohibiting member banks to extend loans to organized crime members. 
(The Asahi Shimbun May 2013) 
 
 In September 2009 the same Japanese Bank Association, established another model clause 
to forbid yakuza to open accounts.  
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 In April 2011 The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds was amended, 
adding provisions for confirmation at the time of transaction and call forwarding service 
providers to Specified Business Operators, and strengthening penalties for illicit transfer 
of savings passbooks and the like. (White paper on Police 2012) 
 
 On July 24th 2011, President Obama signed an Executive Order which included Japanese 
bōryokudan among the transnational organized criminal organizations recognized as 
threat to the national security of the US, and as such with this order he orders the freezing, 
or seizure, of their assets.  
 
 
 In December 2012, the General Insurance Association of Japan, after previously banning 
sales of car insurance to bōryokudan members, enacted a model clause to expel yakuza 
from the insurance business, pressing its member companies to adopt it.  
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